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Summary findings
A group  of heavily  indebted  low-income  countries  (the  gives countries  an  incentive  to maintain  good  policies.
HIPCs),  most  of them  in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  has  But this "short  leash"  approach  entails  transition  costs,
continued  to experienice external  debt  problems.  Because  can  create  uncertainty,  may  lack credibility,  and can
the HIPCs'  economic  characteristics  and external  impede  local ownership  of reform  programs.
imbalances  are very different  from  those of middle-income  Upfront  debt  reduction  can  create  moral  hazard
countries,  the approach  to analyzing  debt  problems  and  problems  and  may weaken  the  incentives  for maintaining
debt-reduction  initiatives  that  was developed  during  the  sound  policy.  But there  are theoretical  arguments  about
debt  crisis of the  1980s  of middlle-income  countries  must  why  a high  level of debt  can  impede  investment  and
be modified  and  complemented  in important  ways.  policy  reform  (because  it is natural  to expect  that  some
With  such  a need  in mind,  Claessens,  Detragiache,  of the  potential  benefits  of reforms  may  be "taxed  away"
Kanbur,  and Wickham  revisit  the methodological  issues  to repay  creditors).
underlying  the analysis  of debt  sustainability,  as well  as  Although  empirical  evidence  concerning  the hypothesis
theory  and  empirical  evidence  on how  large debts  affect  that  HlIPCs suffer  significant  adverse  effects  from  their
economic  performance.  large debt  overhang  is inconclusive,  evidence  from
The  main  question  they  attempt  to answer  is: Should  middle-income  countries  suggests  that  debt  reduction  can
consideration  be given to  more  upfront  debt  reduction  benefit  an  economy  if the policy  environment  is right.
for HIPCs,  over  and  above  that  provided  under  current  But whether  there  should  be further  debt  reduction  for
mechanisms,  or shouIld debts  continue  to be  refinanced,  specific  heavily  indebted  low-income  countries  depends
subject  to conditionality?  on the  facts for each  case and  requires  quantitative
Ongoing  refinancing  with  conditionality,  as opposed  analysis of data  about  different  forces  at play  in the
to upfront  debt  reduction,  reduces  moral  hazard  and  couLntries involved.
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After  a difficult  period  following  the  onset  of the  debt  crisis  in 1982
the  debt situation  of  most  middle-income  debtor  countries  has improved
substantially.  However,  a group  of low-income  countries,  most  of which  are
in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  has,continued  to  experience  serious  difficulties  in
managing  the  servicing  of their  relatively  high  stocks  of external
debt.  1/  The  various  dimensions  of the  strategy  currently  adopted  by the
international  community  towards  policy  reform  and  the  debt  servicing
difficulties  experienced  by the  HIPCs  have  been  highlighted  in detail  in
previous  work  by the  Fund  and the  Bank (IMF  (1995a)  and  World  Bank (1995)).
Instruments  used  have  included  rescheduling,  concessional  refinancing,  and
the  provision  of further  resources,  the  process  being  associated  with close
policy  monitoring  and  conditionality.  Under  London  Terms,  and  subsequently
Naples  Terms,  the  approach  has been supplemented  by offers  of  partial  debt
stock  reduction  by Paris  Club creditors  conditional  upon the  establishment
of a track  record  of  policy  implementation  and  ongoing  adjustment  efforts.
Given  the  low  levels  of per  capita  income,  most  of the  HIPCs  are  expected
1/  -- This group  of  countries,  referred  to  as the  heavily-indebted  poor
countries  (HIPCs)  includes  41 countries,  of which  32 countries  are those
classified  as severely  indebted  low-income  countries  (SILICs)  according  to
the  World  Debt  Tables  1994-95  classification,  an additional  seven  are
countries  that  have  received  concessional  treatment  from  the  Paris  Club,  and
two  are  lower  middle-income  countries  that  have recently  become  IDA-only
countries  (Angola  and  the  Congo). The countries  covered  are  Angola,  Benin,
Bolivia,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,
Congo,  C6te d'Ivoire,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Ethiopia,  Ghana,  Guinea,  Guinea-
Bissau,  Guyana,  Honduras,  Kenya,  Lao PDR, Liberia,  Madagascar,  Mali,
Mauritania,  Mozambique,  Myanmar,  Nicaragua,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Rwanda,  Sao  Tome
& Principe,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone,  Somalia,  Sudan,  Tanzania,  Togo,  Uganda,
Viet Nam,  Republic  of  Yemen,  Zaire,  and Zambia.-2-
to  be offered  conditional  debt reduction  by the  Paris  Club  at a level  of
concessionality  of 67  percent  in present  value  terms  on their  eligible
debt;  Z/  post-cut  off  date debt  has not  been considered  eligible  and  no
further  reschedulings  are  presumed. The indebted  country  is  also  committed
under Paris  Club  rescheduling  to seek comparable  debt  relief  from  commercial
creditors  and  from  official  bilateral  creditors  outside  the  Paris  Club.  ./
A number  of debt  redu*tion  and restructuring  agreements  have  been
reached  between  the  HIPCs  and  commercial  creditors,  a process  aided  by the
provision  of financing  for  such  purposes  from  official  creditors. However,
in a limited  number  of  HIPCs,  matters  remain  to  be resolved  with  private
creditors. For  official  bilateral  creditors  outside  the  Paris  Club,  it  has
proved  somewhat  more  difficult  to achieve  a coordinated  response,  in part
because  of  valuation  problems  and thus  determining  what  might  constitute
comparable  treatment  of claims. The multilaterals  have  continued  to
concentrate  on  providing  financing  and  have not  played  a role  in  debt-stock
reduction  (at  least  with respect  to their  own loans),  except  in  so far  as
providing  concessional  refinancing  lowers  debt in  present  value  terms.
Creditor  and  debtor  countries  as  well as the  international  financial
institutions  are  currently  debating  whether  existing  initiatives  are
sufficient  to  resolve  the  debt  problems  of the  HIPCs  and, if  not,  how to
_./  Countries  with  a per  capita  income  of  more than  US$500  and  an overall
indebtedness  ratio  of  less than  350 percent  of exports  in  present  value
terms  may  receive  a 50  percent  level  of concessionality  on a case-by-case
basis.
I/  The  major  bilateral  creditors  outside  the  Paris  Club  are  Russia,
China,  and  Arab  countries,  including  Kuwait,  Libya,  and  Saudi  Arabia.  In
some instances,  notably  the  claims  of Russia,  the  valuation  of  non-Paris
Club creditor  claims  has  been the subject  of dispute  between  creditors  and
debtors,  reflecting  among  other things,  differences  on the  appropriate
exchange  rate  to  use  in  valuation.-3-
develop  appropriate  new  strategies. To provide  a conceptual  framework  in
which to analyze  the  HIPCs'  debt problem,  this  paper  addresses  some  of the
methodological  issues  underlying  debt sustainability  analysis  and  it reviews
the theory  and  empirical  evidence  on the  effects  of debt  on  macroeconomic
performance  as they  apply  to the specific  case  of the  HIPCs.
The debt  problems  of the  HIPCs differ  in  many  dimensions  from  those  of
the  middle-income  countrie-F  that  received  most  of the  attention  of
economists  and  policy-makers  during  the  Debt Crisis  of the  1980s.  The
HIPCs  are characterized  not only  by high debt,  but  also  by relatively  poor
economic  performance  and  slow  economic  policy  reform. The  links  between
high debt and  the  implementation  of policy  reform  are  thus  crucial. Also,
in contrast  with  middle-income  countries,  the  HIPCs  have  continued  to
receive  a positive  net  transfer  of resources  from  external  creditors  and
donors--the  median  ratio  of  net transfers  to GDP  was  about  11  percent  on
average-during  the  1990-94  period.  In spite  of these  large  net  transfers,
most HIPCs  are in  arrears  on at least  a portion  of their  external
obligations. Finally,  the  creditors  of the  HIPCs  are  mainly  official
creditors  (bilateral  and  multilateral)  as opposed  to  private  commercial
creditors. Accordingly,  creditor  behavior  is  not driven  primarily  by profit
maximization,  but  rather  by a  more complex  set  of goals. These
considerations  suggest  that,  to provide  a useful  background  to the  policy
debate,  the  conventional  approach  for  analyzing  debt  problems  and  debt
reduction  options  needs  to  be adapted  to accommodate  the  specific
characteristics  of  the  HIPCs. This is the  goal  of this  paper.-4-
The material  is  organized  as follows: Section  II  contains  a  brief
overview  of the  structure  and the  recent  evolution  the  external  debt  of the
HIPCs.  In Section  III  debt  sustainability  analysis  is discussed  and  the
option  available  to  creditors  in case  debt is judged  to  be  unsustainable  are
reviewed. Section  IV  contains  a discussion  of the  effects  of  debt (and  of
debt  reduction)  on economic  performance,  while Section  V reviews  existing
empirical  evidence  on the  #ubject.  Section  VI concludes.
II.  An Overview  of the  Debt Situation  of the  HIPCs
As background  to the  analysis,  it is  useful  to consider  some  summary
information  on the  external  debt  situation  of the  HIPCs.  In  all  of  the
HIPCs,  the  external  debt  stock  was at least  twice  the  value  of  exports  on
average  during  the  1992-94  period,  with several  countries  having  ratios  in
excess  of 1000  percent.  i/  In contrast  to Latin  American  debt,  however,
a  sizeable  portion  of the  debt  of most of the  HIPCs  was contracted  on
concessional  terms. Because  of concessionality,  the  face  value  of  external
debt is  not a good  measure  of the  debt  burden. The ratio  of  the  present
value  of future  debt  service  obligations  to exports  is a  more informative
indicator. ./  Figure  1  presents  the  data for  most of the  HIPCs  (37)
averaged  for the  1992-94  period;  the  black  bar gives  the  face  value  of  debt
while the  cross-hatched  bar  shows  the  present  value  measure  of  debt (PVDS).
After concessionality  is  taken  into  account,  the  debt-to-exports  ratio  was
below  200  percent  for  four  countries  and  was  between  200  percent  and
i/  The  data are  taken  from  the  World  Bank's  1996  World  Debt  Tables.
5.1  The  measure  takes  into  account  both the  profile  of debt  service
payments  and  the  concessionality  of the  debt structure  by discounting  the
stream  of debt  service  payments.-5-
400  percent  for  20 countries. Five countries  had  ratios  between  400  percent
and 600  percent,  and the  remaining  eight  were above  1000  percent;  the  median
was 340  percent. To put these  numbers  in  perspective,  at the  height  of the
debt crisis  in the  mid-1980s  the  comparable  debt-to-exports  ratio  was  about
400  percent  for  Mexico,  450  percent  for  Brazil,  and  700  percent  for
Argentina;  for  non-HIPC  developing  countries,  the  ratio  has averaged  about
130  percent  in recent  year#.
The  magnitude  of the indebtedness  indicators  in the  HIPCs  results  from
the  combined  effect  of sizeable  external  inflows  and low  growth  rates  of
output  and exports  over the  past  decade. A number  of factors  have  been
behind  the  relatively  weak  economic  performance  of these  countries,
including  adverse  terms  of trade  developments  and the  incidence  of drought
and civil  war.  However,  deficiencies  in  macroeconomic  management  and  the
persistence  of microeconomic  distortions  and structural  weaknesses  have
also  played  a significant  role. Although  most of the  HIPCs  have  had
economic  stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  programs  supported  by
the  Fund  and the  Bank  for  a  number  of years,  the  pace  of policy  reform  has
remained  uneven.
For the  HIPCs,  with only  one  exception,  debt  service  paid in  1993  (the
most.  recent  year for  a which  a full data  set  has  been assembled)  was  below
contractual  debt  service. Figure  2 shows  the  distribution  of the  number  of
countries  by debt  service  paid to debt  service  due  by decile. This  pattern
has been a recurring  feature  of the  difficulties  that  the  HIPCs  have  faced
in  managing  their  external  debt  situations  in  recent  years. Arrears  have
been accumulated  largely  towards  official  bilateral  creditors,  although  a
small  number  of HIPCs  have incurred  relatively  large  arrears  to commercial-6-
creditors. Rescheduling  and debt  restructuring  by Paris  Club  creditors  in
the  context  of programs  supported  by the  Fund  and  the  Bank  have  been the
main instruments  used  to deal  with the  problem  of HIPC  arrears  and  to lower
their  contractual  debt service  obligations. Most HIPCs  have  fully  serviced
their  multilateral  obligations,  but four  HIPCs (Liberia,  Somalia,  Sudan,
and  Zaire)  have  arrears  of six  months  or more to the  Bank  and  the  Fund.
Eight  countries  (the  four .isted  above  plus Central  African  Republic,
Guinea-Bissau,  Madagascar,  and  Niger)  have arrears  of six  months  or  more
with the  African  Development  Bank.
The  composition  by type  of creditor  of the  HIPCs'  aggregate  debt (in
present  value  terms)  is shown  in Figure  3.  j/  The total  stock  was
US$164  billion  in  present  value terms  at the  end  of 1994. Debt  to private
creditors  amounted  to 17  percent  of the  total  (7  percent  short  term  and
10 percent  long  term). Debt to official  bilateral  creditors  was  about
64 percent  of the  total,  which  was  more or less  evenly  divided  between
Paris  Club  and  non-Paris  Club  creditors. The  remaining  19  percent  of the
total  is accounted  for  by multilateral  institutions,  the  distribution
of which  is also  shown  in Figure  3.
j/  The  aggregate  data cover  IDA-only  HIPCs,  thereby  excluding  Nigeria.
Nigeria's  large  size  relative  to the  other  HIPCs  would distort  the  aggregate
picture.-7-
It is important  to  note that  most HIPCs  have  continued  to  receive
a positive  net transfer  of resources  from  the  creditor/donor  community.  Z/
The  median  of  net transfers  to the  HIPCs  was about  11  percent  of GDP on
average  over  the  1990-94  period.  This is in  contrast  to the  situation
facing  the  heavily-indebted  middle-income  countries  in the  mid-1980s  which
were obliged  to  make substantial  net transfers  of resources  to creditors;
the  average  net transfer  of resources  to external  creditors  over  the
1984-88  period,  for  example,  amounted  to 5  percent  of GDP  for  Mexico  and
over 2  percent  of  GDP  for  Brazil  and  Argentina  (Cohen  (1995)).
Maintaining  positive  net resource  transfers  to the  HIPCs  has required
an increased  commitment  of resources  on concessional  terms  by official
creditors. Official  bilateral  creditors  have increasingly  made  resources
available  to the  HIPCs  on a grant  basis  and  they  have also  restructured
portions  of outstanding  claims  on concessional  terms  or  written  off portions
of such-claims  for  countries  judged  to be performing  well.  Resources  from
the  multilateral  institutions  have in recent  years  been largely  confined  to
loans  on  highly  concessional  terms  and these  now  account  for  the  bulk of new
net debt-creating  flows  to the  HIPCs.
III.  Debt Sustainability  Analysis
When  creditors  consider  debt relief  initiatives  for  a  highly  indebted
country  a crucial  question  is whether  the  current  debt  burden  is  judged  to
be sustainable,  i.e.  whether  the  countries  will  be able  in all  likelihood  to
Ii  The  net transfer  of resources  from  such  creditors  is  defined  as grants
plus  new loan  disbursements  minus actual  interest  payments  and  amortization
of principal.-8-
meet its  current  and  future  external  obligations  in  full  without  resorting
to rescheduling  in the  future  or accumulations  of arrears.  j/  In the  case
of the  HIPCs,  most  of  which  have experienced  arrears  and  rescheduling  in the
recent  past, the  question  is  whether future  export  and  output  growth
prospects  are  strong  enough  to bring to an end  debt servicing  difficulties
within  a reasonable  period  of time.
The  basic  rationale  fpr  the analysis  of debt sustainability  scenarios
arises  out  of consideration  of national  solvency. The  national  solvency
constraint  by itself  imposes  relatively  weak conditions  on  the  behavior
of the  private  and  public  sectors  and may  not  necessarily  be a  binding
constraint,  but it  does  provide  a framework  within  which  to  assess  a
country's  ability  to  meet its  future  debt obligations.  i/  For  example,
as Buiter  (1989)  puts it, ". ....the 'forward-looking' accounting framework
involved  in solvency  assessments  can be used to evaluate  the  internal
consistency  of  plans  for  external  borrowing,  debt  service,  exports,  imports
and other  external  transactions."  Nevertheless,  it  needs  to  be stressed
that  a considerable  amount  of (explicit  or implicit)  economic  modelling  is
required  to undertake  such  exercises-  so as to form  a conditional  judgement
as to sustainability.
i./ This type  of  analysis  obviously  cannot  answer  the  question  of  whether
the  burden  of debt  service  is excessive  according  to some  welfare  criterion.
Such a judgement  is  not  a matter  of positive  economics;  see  for  example
Williamson  (1988).
_/  The national  solvency  condition  looks  forward  into  the  indefinite
future  and  requires  assumptions  about the  evolution  of the  trade  balance (on
goods and  nonfactor  services)  over time.  Deficits  can  be run  for  extended
periods  of time  provided  surpluses  sufficient  to repay  existing  debt  plus
interest  are  generated  at some  stage.  See,  for  example,  Eaton  and
Fernandez  (1995).-9-
The methodology  typically  employed  for  debt  sustainability  calculations
involves  choosing  a time  horizon (often  10  years  or even  20  years  out),  and
projecting  the  growth  rates  of the  main macroeconomic  variables  in the
indebted  country  for  that  horizon  (see,  for instance,  Cline  (1995)). These
projections,  together  with  estimates  of future  voluntary  inflows  of foreign
capital,  are then  used  to  construct  the  balance  of payments  accounts  for
the country. For  externalodebt  to be judged  sustainable,  the  scenarios
must satisfy  two  conditions:  first,  during  the  projection  period  balance
of payments  equilibrium  must  be achieved  without  resorting  to  exceptional
financing;  and  second,  the  level  of indebtedness  at the  end  of the  period
must be low  enough  to  make future  debt service  problems  unlikely. The
latter  condition  is  typically  evaluated  by computing  indebtedness  indicators
such  as the  debt-to-GDP  ratio,  the debt-to-exports  ratio,  or the  debt-
service  ratio,  for  the  last  years  of the  projection  period.
Desiding  whether  these  ratios  are sufficiently  low  inevitably  involves
the  exercise  of a fair  amount  of judgement. As noted,  for  example  in
IMF (1987),  it is  often  not  possible,  even after  the  fact,  to  measure  the
factors  that  would  allow  an  accurate  prediction  as to  what  levels  of the
ratios  would  be sustainable.  The chief  practical  value  of indicators  is
that they  signal  situations  in which  debt service  difficulties  become
increasingly  likely. The "rule  of thumb"  warning  sign  is  usually  taken  to
be when the  ratio  of the  present  value of debt  service  to  exports  is  of the
order  of 200-250  percent  and  where the  debt service-to-exports  ratio  is of
the  order  of 20-25  percent;  these  figures  are  based  on an empirical  analysis
of the experience  of  developing  countries  and their  debt  service  performance
over time.  For instance,  Underwood (1990)  ranked  111  developing  countries- 10  -
by their  ratio  of debt  to exports,  with debt  defined  net  of official
reserves  and adjusted  for  the  degree  of concessionality.  With  one
exception,  all the  countries  that  avoided  rescheduling  had  debt-to-export
ratios  below 200  percent,  while  most countries  with a history  of
rescheduling  or interest  arrears  had debt-to-exports  ratios  above
200  percent.  Cohen  (1995)  revisited  the issue,  and  proposed  an additional
way of identifying  the  critical  threshold  for  African  debt  based  on the
experience  of Latin  American  countries: the  maximum  net transfer  to
creditors  that  these  countries  made during  the  most difficult  part  of the
debt  crisis  was  around  5  percent  of GDP.  Given  the  current  export-to-GDP
ratio  for  Africa  and  under  some  assumptions  about  the  real  interest  rate
and the  future  rate  of growth  of the  African  countries,  similarly  sized
transfers  would  translate  into  a debt-to-exports  ratio  of around  200  percent
(in  present  value  terms)  and  is consistent  with  Underwood's  findings.
Threshold  debt  ratios  derived  for  developing  countries  in  general
may not  be fully  applicable  to the  HIPCs  because  these  countries  are  the
recipients  of large  inflows  of foreign  assistance  both in the  form  of
grants  and concessional  loans. Hence,  the  debt  servicing  capacity  of
the  HIPCs  depends  not  only  on their  ability  to generate  foreign  exchange
through  exports,  but also  on how  much foreign  assistance  is  expected  to  be
forthcoming  in the  future. Most of these  countries  can  expect  to receive
positive  net transfers  for  the  foreseeable  future,  and thus  it is  possible
to argue  the  debt-to-exports  ratio  can  underestimate  their  ability  to
sustain  a given  level  of debt.  It can also  be argued  that  the  expectation
of the  receipt  of a stream  of positive  transfers  over time  for  this  group
of countries  changes  the  nature  of possible  intertemporal  allocation.  Thus,- 11.  -
a judgement  can  be made as to the  extent  to  which it is reasonable  to  bring
forward  debt-creating  flows  to the  present  (and  hence accept  higher  debt
stocks  in  present  value  terms  now) in order  to finance  increased  investment
and consumption  today.  1i/
To construct  debt sustainability  scenarios  it is  necessary  to  make
assumptions  on the  future  path of economic  policy  in the  indebted  country.
Here several  approaches  may  be adopted. One  could  be to  project  the  policy
stance  that appears  most likely  to be adopted,  and  which  may  not  necessarily
be fully  consistent  with a scenario  of  high long-term  growth. In  this  case,
the  projections  would  reflect  the "best  available  forecast"  of future
economic  performance.  LJ/  Alternatively,  the scenarios  may  be
constructed  under  the  assumption  that,  to the  extent  judged  politically  and
economically  feasible,  future  policies  will  be aimed  at enhancing  output  and
export  growth  through  adjustment  and  reform  programs  which  will  maximize  the
country's  long-term  repayment  capacity. This can  be referred  to  as the
"best  policies"  approach.  LZ/
jQ/  In other  words  this  is a question  of "aid  now" versus  "aid  later",
and embraces  the issue  of to  what extent  future  aid  flows  should  be
encumbered  for  the sake  of  being  able  to use the  resources  today.
1.1/ This type  of approach  has  been taken  in determining  whether  certain
European  countries  are  likely  under  a continuation  of present  policies  to
meet the  fiscal  criteria  set  out in the  Maastricht  Treaty.
12/ As discussed  in the  next section,  the  debt  overhang  theory  suggests
that  the  presence  of a large  stock  of debt  may deter  the  adoption  of
policies  that  maximize  future  repayment  capacity. If that  theory  has
empirical  relevance,  then  choosing  a "best  policies"  approach  in  debt
sustainability  analysis  could  be problematic.- 12 -
Because  most  of the  external  debt of HIPCs  is public  debt,  external
debt sustainability  requires  that the  external  payments  situation  and the
government  budget  should  be considered  alongside  each  other. Hence,  the
analysis  should  consider  whether  the government  will  be able,  and  willing,
to adjust  and  restructure  noninterest  public  expenditure,  taxation,  and
domestic  financing  to  be consistent  with the  size  and  path of the  scheduled
net fiscal  transfers  forthooming  from  abroad. Thus, it  may  be misleading
to characterize  a  country  in terms  of a single  representative,  national
agent  with command  over the  country's  resources  and  to overlook  the
constraints  and  the  behavioral  differences  and interactions  between  the
private  and  public  sectors.  13/  In addition,  some  governments  have
direct  access  to foreign  exchange  because  of their  control  of export
revenues,  e.g.,  through  state  oil  companies,  so that  they  are  less  dependent
on taxing  the  private  sector  in order  to obtain  the  domestic  resources
necessary  to acquire  the  needed  foreign  exchange  for  the  discharge  of
external  debt  service  obligations. Past  experience  with external  debt
crises  indicates  that  in a significant  number  of countries  debt  problems
have been due  to fiscal  problems  and  not  necessarily  to balance  of payments
difficulties  (Cohen,  1988a). Also,  as in several  HIPCs  fiscal  reform  and
consolidation  has proved  difficult  to achieve  (World  Bank (1994)),  this
dimension  of debt  sustainability  needs  careful  evaluation.
For  any  particular  country  debt sustainability  analysis  has some
limitations. First,  the  calculations  are  sensitive  to the  projections
IV/  Just as  national  solvency  considerations  lie  behind  the  forward-
lodking  external  accounting  framework,  so do fiscal  solvency  considerations
lie  behind  intertemporal  analysis  of the  fiscal  accounts.- 13 -
of exogenous  variables  and  the  margins  of error  are  inevitably  large.
For instance,  the  balance  of payments  position  of several  HIPCs  depends
crucially  on the  behavior  of commodity  prices,  and  any  significant
deviation  of commodity  prices  from the  path  envisioned  in the  projections
can  potentially  alter  the  conclusions  about  debt  sustainability.  At the
onset  of the  debt  crisis  in the  early 1980s,  some  projection  models  reached
the conclusion  that  Latin  American  debt  was sustainable  in  part  because
they failed  to  predict  the  sharp  drop in commodity  prices  that  occurred
in the  mid-1980s  (Cline,  1995). The implications  of such  deviations  can,
however,  be examined  by undertaking  sensitivity  analyses  in  the  scenarios.
Second,  debt  sustainability  analysis  measures  a country's  "ability  to
pay" but,  as emphasized  by the literature  on sovereign  debt  pioneered  by
Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1981),  debt problems  may derive  from  a lack  of
"willingness  to  pay".  Thus,  an indebted  government  that  has the  necessary
revenues  to finance  debt  service  may still  choose  to run  arrears  if the
consequences  of the  default  are thought  to  be minimal. For  countries
indebted  towards  commercial  creditors,  default  costs  include  reduced  access
to future  credit  and  foreign  investment  and,  possibly,  to foreign  markets,
as well as the  loss  of reputation  for fulfilling  contractual  obligations.
These  costs  have  played  an important  part in  motivating  countries  to repay
during  the  debt  crisis. The literature  on sovereign  debt  has  not,  however,
addressed  the issue  of  what the  perceived  costs  of a default  may  be when
the  creditors  are  foreign  countries  (who  also  provide  development
assistance)  and  multilateral  institutions.  As indicated  in  Section  II,
most of the  HIPCs  are  servicing  at least  a portion  of their  external  debt,
but at the  same  time  they  are receiving  large  inflows  of  development- 14 -
assistance  that  official  creditors/donor  provide  in  a concerted  effort  to
support  the indebted  country. The  potential  effects  of a debtor's  default
on the flows  of foreign  assistance  forthcoming  from  official  creditors  is
bound to  be an important  element  in determining  "willingness  to  pay" in
the  HIPCs.
If a country's  debt  has  become so large  that  the  country  cannot
reasonably  be expected  to  service it as scheduled,  creditors  must decide
on how to react  when  debtors  go into arrears. In some  cases  the  indebted
country  may decide  that  outstanding  claims  are  so large  that  it  makes
little  sense  attempting  to service  much of the  debt  at all.  This  amounts
to an explicit  default  on the  part of the  debtor  and  arrears  will continue
to accumulate,  the  consequences  of which depend  on  a multiplicity  of factors
including  the  identity  of the  creditor. The creditors  have  to decide  on the
suspension  of  new  disbursements,  including  for  official  bilateral  creditors
whether-that  should  embrace  halting  assistance  in the  form  of  grants. If
the indebted  country  is endeavoring  to  make some (more  than  token)  debt
service  payments,  the  creditors  may decide  to provide  increased  new
financing  to the  country,  so that debt payments  can  be made out  of the
proceeds  of a  new loan;  but such a reaction  is  clearly  problematic  if the
debt sustainability  analysis  subsequently  suggests  that  the  debt  is so  high
that solvency  rather  than  liquidity  is really  at issue. Or a  judgement  can
be made by creditors  that  reducing  the outstanding  obligations  by forgiving
part of the  principal  or of the interest  is  justified. Interest  rate
reduction  can  also  be done indirectly,  by means  of a commitment  to refinance
old loans  by means  of  new loans  at lower  interest  rates.- 15  -
If the  last  course  of action  is chosen  and  relief  on  part  of the  debt
is granted  the  creditors  lose  the residual  recovery  value  on  part  of their
claims:  if,  contrary  to expectations,  the  debtor's  economic  performance
happens  to improve  to  a degree  that restores  solvency  (or  willingness  to
pay), the  creditors  will  have no right  to demand  full  payment. On the  other
hand, if the  country  was  in arrears  or if the  refinancing  alternative  had
been pursued,  then  the  cre#itors  would receive  an increased  debt  service
payment.  Of course,  the  more sustainable  the  external  debt  position  of the
country  appears  to  be, the  larger  is the creditors'  residual  recovery  value
on part of their  claims,  and the larger  is the  cost  of explicit  debt
reduction  relative  to  other  courses  of action. Decisions  by Paris  Club
creditors  to offer  partial  and conditional  debt  reduction  under  London  Terms
and subsequently  under  Naples  Terms can  be interpreted  partly  as reflecting
a judgement  that  the  stock  of debt outstanding  for  many of the  HIPCs  was
reasonably  judged  to  be unsustainable  and the  residual  recovery  value  on
some  part of the  debt  minimal  (at  least  relative  to the  potential  benefits
from debt  forgiveness).
It should  also  be noted  that the  upfront  accounting  loss  resulting
from a debt  reduction  operation  is likely  to  be much  larger  than  the
economic  loss  if  the  loan  is still  kept at face  value  or is otherwise
overvalued  on the  creditors'  books,  and adequate  or realistic  loan-loss
provisions  have  not  been  set  aside.  In practice,  some  creditors  may  be
reluctant  to grant  debt  forgiveness  because  they  are  unwilling  or unable
to take  a large  accounting  loss.  Also, explicit  debt  reduction  may expose
the  extent  of  past  imprudent  lending  decisions  with adverse  effects  on the
reputation  of the  creditor  vis-a-vis  borrowers  and  financial  markets.  In- 16 -
this case,  the  ability  to refinance  nonperforming  loans,  thereby  concealing
the  losses,  may create  a moral  hazard  problem  on the  creditor  side.  In
private  commercial  banking,  regulatory  limits  on  banks'  exposure  towards
individual  borrowers  therefore  limit  the  use of the  refinancing  strategy.
If creditors  deal  with  a situation  in  which  debt  has  become
unsustainable  by granting  debt  relief  through  some  debt  reduction  and/or
ongoing  refinancing,  then  she debtor  is  not formally  in  default,  and
creditors  consent  to  accept  a different  schedule  and/or  different  amounts
of debt service  payments  than  called  for in the  original  loan  contracts.
Hence,  if this  action  is interpreted  as a sign that  creditors  are  "soft"
on debtors  who do  not  pay,  it  may create  moral  hazard  problems: the
country  in question  may  consider  that further  significant  deviations  from
contractual  obligations  in  the  future  will also  be tolerated,  and  other
debtors  may form  the  same  opinion  and follow  suit  as  well.  The  issue  of
moral  hazard  is  discussed  further  in Section  IV.3  below.
It also  needs  to  borne  in  mind that  there  are  limits  on the  extent
to which it  may  be judged  appropriate  to grant  debt  relief  by reducing  the
level  (in  present  value  terms)  of a country's  external  debt. The  fact
that  a country  has entered  into  loan contracts  carries  with  it  an
obligation  to  make  bona  fide  efforts  to service  such contracts,  and  this
implies  servicing  debt  up to  the limit  reasonably  judged  to  be sustainable.
While such  judgements  are  difficult  to  make, for  creditors  to  do  more  than
this (by  reducing  outstanding  claims  still  further)  so as,  for  example,  as
to  make room for  a larger  volume  of new loans,  would  be incompatible  with
the  nature  of the  loan  contracts  entered  into  and  would  be dynamically
inconsistent;  furthermore,  if  fresh  loans (rather  than  grants)  were  to- 17 -
continue  over time,  it  would  only  make sense  to the extent  that  such  new
loans  were expected  to  be accompanied  by growth  in the  indebted  country's
debt servicing  capacity.
IV.  Debt  and  Economic  Performance: Theory
At the center  of the  HIPC external  debt  problem  is the  question  of
whether  the  large  debt  bur4en  is one  of the  factors  contributing  to  weak
economic  performance  and  the  uneven  pace of economic  reform  in these
countries. Although  the  need to service  external  debt  can  be expected  to
reduce  growth  and investment  provided  future  access  to external  resources  is
unaffected,  the  question  is  whether  the  adverse  effects  may  be of a
sufficient  magnitude  to justify  increased  explicit  debt  reduction  beyond  the
presently  available  mechanisms. This section  reviews  the  insights  that
economic  theory  has to  offer  on the  relationship  between  debt  burden  and
economic  performance.
1.  The  debt overhang  theory
The  main theoretical  argument  in support  of explicit  debt  reduction,
as opposed  to continued  flow  rescheduling,  is the  debt overhang  theory.
The theory  is  based  on the  premise  that,  if  debt  will exceed  the  country's
repayment  ability  with some  probability  in the  future,  expected  debt  service
is likely  to  be an increasing  function  of the  country's  output  level. Thus,
some  of the  returns  from  investing  in the domestic  economy  are  effectively
"taxed  away"  by existing  foreign  creditors,  and investment  by domestic  and
new foreign  investors  is discouraged. According  to the  theory,  a reduction
in the face  value  of future  debt obligations  will reduce  the  distortion  due*  18 -
to the  implicit  tax,  and this  will increase  investment  (see,  for  instance,
Krugman  (1988)). Since  debt reduction  leads  to increased  investment  and
repayment  capacity,  the  portion  of the  debt  that  remains  outstanding  becomes
more likely  to  be repaid. If this effect  is strong  enough,  then  debt
reduction  may  benefit  the  creditors  as well  as the  debtor,  and  the  debtor
is said  to  be on the "wrong"  side  of the  debt  Laffer  curve.  14/  If the
debtor  is on the "right"  s,de  of the  Laffer  curve,  debt  reduction  may  still
be a "positive  sum  game",  but creditors  need to receive  some  compensation,
perhaps  in the  form  of enhancements  that  increase  the  value  of the  remaining
debt.  This essentially  is the  approach  to  debt reduction  used  in the  Brady
deals.  15/
The  debt  overhang  theory  was originally  formulated  for  countries
heavily  indebted  towards  private  commercial  creditors. The  HIPCs,  on the
other  hand,  are  mostly  indebted  towards  official  creditors,  and  they  also
receive  substantial  transfers  often  in the form  of concessional  assistance
from  some  of their  creditors. If creditors  allocate  foreign  assistance
independently  of the  size  of debt-related  flows,  then the  standard  debt
overhang  theory  would  apply  equally  to the  HIPCs.  If the foreign  assistance
is related  to the  debt and  debt  service  of  HIPCs,  whether  and  how  a debt
overhang  may create  adverse  incentive  effects  for  economic  performance  is
14/  The debt  Laffer  curve  graphs  expected  repayment  as a function  of
the  face  value  of debt  service. Along the  "right"  side  of the  curve,  an
increase  in the  face  value  of debt  service  leads  to an increase  in
repayment,  while  along  the  "wrong"  side of the  curve  increases  in the
face  value  of the  debt reduce  expected  repayment.
15/  Even if it  benefits  the  creditors  as a group,  debt  reduction  may  be
difficult  to achieve  because  each  creditor  has an incentive  to free-ride.
The  concerted  approach  adopted  in the  Brady  deals  was designed  to get  around
the  free-rider  problem.- 19  -
a more complex question.  The answer depends on the specific criteria
according to which foreign assistance flows are determined.  For instance,
creditors may reduce foreign assistance to countries whose economic
conditions improve.  In this case, incentives to undertake growth-enhancing
activities are weakened, but this is true regardless of the size of external
debt.  However, if, in addition, heavily-indebted countries are more likely
to be dependent on foreign assistance  in the future, then the adverse
incentive effects are worse for these countries.  Conversely, if foreign
assistance tends to be provided as growth-enhancing policies are undertaken,
then the debt overhang effects would tend to be weakened.
In its original formulation the debt overhang theory centered on the
adverse effects of debt on investment  in physical capital.  The scope of the
theory, however, is  much broader.  To the extent that foreign creditors are
expected to appropriate some of the benefits of future growth, any activity
that involves incurring costs upfront for the sake of increased output in
the future will be discouraged  (Corden (1989)).  Such activities may include
investment in human capital and in technology acquisition, whose effects on
growth may be even stronger over time in HIPCs than the effect of investment
in physical capital.  Also, the implementation of extensive economic
reforms, such as trade liberalization, privatization, or fiscal reform, may
entail incurring an immediate cost (political as well as economic), while
the benefits will materialize only in the future.  If policymakers expect
foreign creditors to appropriate most of the gains from policy reform
through larger debt service payments, then the presence of a debt overhang- 20 -
may  be a strong  obstacle  to  economic  reform.  L6/  This  potential  effect
is of particular  concern  in the  case of the  HIPCs,  where  the  extent  of
microeconomic  distortions  and  poor  macroeconomic  management  is  often  such
that widespread  policy  reform  is a prerequisite  for  sustained  and  stable
growth  (World  Bank (1994)).
Since  in the  HIPCs  external  debt is mostly  a liability  of the
government,  strictly  speakng the overhang  effects  outlined  above  should
only affect  actions  under  direct  government  control,  that  is  public
investment  or  policy  reform. How a debt  overhang  discourages  private
investment  depends  on  how the  government  is  expected  to raise  the  fiscal
revenue  necessary  to finance  external  debt service.  17/ For  instance,  if
the  government  is  expected  to resort  to the  inflation  tax  or to  a capital
levy,  private  investment  is likely  to  be discouraged.  18/  If  revenue
will be raised  through  an export  tax, then investment  in  the  export-oriented
sector  will  be depressed.
1i6  It could  also  be argued  that,  to some  extent,  the  assistance  provided
by foreign  creditors/donors  slows  down the  pace  of reform. Without  this
external  assistance  some  countries  might  be obliged  to  reform  much faster,
albeit  at a  higher  cost.
17/  To the  extent  that  private  and public  investment  are  complementary,  a
debt overhang  that  leads  to cuts in public  investment  would  reduce  private
investment  independently  of tax considerations.
18/  Hadjimichael  et al. (1995)  find that  inflation  has  a significant  and
negative  impact  on private  investment  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.- 21 -
2.  Other effects of debt on economic performance
The debt overhang effect is only one of the channels through  which the
need to service a large amount of external obligations can affect economic
performance.  Other channels may prove  to be equally as important.  These
include the "crowding-out"  effect, the lack of access to international
financial markets, and the effects of the stock of debt on the general
level of uncertainty in thB economy.
The debt overhang theory implies that a reduction in future debt
service should lead to an increase in current investment.  A perhaps
stronger case can be made that a reduction in current debt service should
lead to an increase in current investment for any given level of future
indebtedness.  This is because the smaller is debt service the more
resources are available to finance investment without reducing consumption;
hence, the utility cost of financing investment should be smaller, and more
investment should  be carried out.  Cohen (1993)  has dubbed this effect the
"crowding out" effect of debt on investment. 19/  While the debt overhang
effect clearly implies that a strategy of debt reduction is  better than one
of ongoing rescheduling combined with new resource inflows, this is not the
case for the "crowding  out" effect.  If there is no debt overhang, then an
identical increase in investment could be obtained by giving the country
a new loan instead of reducing current debt service, since a new loan would
19/  For this effect to be at work  the country must have imperfect access
to world capital markets, which is certainly the case for HIPCs; the
argument also assumes that the way  in which debt service is reduced does not
affect access to  new official assistance.- 22 -
be just as effective at "crowding in" investment. 20/  So being able to
empirically distinguish between the two effects has important  consequences
for the design of a strategy towards HIPCs debt problems.
Several authors have noted that the developing countries involved in
the debt crisis of the 1980s,  having lost access to world financial  markets,
experienced a sharp increase in their shadow cost of capital, which greatly
contributed to the decline in investment and output. 21/ A major benefit
of debt reduction operations in middle-income  countries has been to restore
access to international financial markets  and to encourage the repatriation
of flight capital.  While the inflows of "involuntary" new money in the
rescheduling period of middle-income countries (1983-89) went to the
indebted country government, the capital inflows of the early 1990s were
directed primarily to the private sector.  Presumably, this led to a better
allocation of resources and a more efficient selection of investment
projects.  Hence, a potential  benefit of a strategy of debt reduction
relative to one of ongoing refinancing is that debt reduction  may help
strengthen the private sector in the indebted countries.  However, because
several of the HIPCs would be unlikely to attract much foreign  private
20/  Of course, in the extreme case in which creditors always  provide
sufficient new money to cover debt repayment so that the need to service.
more debt does not result in a larger net transfer to creditors,  investment
would not be crowded out at all.
21/  See Detragiache (1992)  for a theoretical model, and
Borensztein  (1990a) for numerical simulations indicating that this effect is
large.  Also, Cohen (1993)  points out that, to assess whether debt played a
role in reducing investment in developing countries, the investment  levels
of the 1980s should be compared to those of the 1960s, and not to investment
in the 1970s, when developing countries temporarily enjoyed relatively easy
access to world financial  markets.- 23  -
capital  even after  receiving  some  external  debt reduction,  this  argument  may
be less  relevant  than  in  the  case of middle-income  countries.
Another  argument  that is sometimes  made to support  explicit  debt
reduction  is that  with  ongoing  rescheduling  there  is considerable
uncertainty  as to  what  fraction  of scheduled  debt  payments  will  be
serviced  from  the country's  own resources. This amount  is--implicitly  or
explicitly--the  subject  of#ongoing  negotiations  between  the  authorities  in
the indebted  country  and  the  various  categories  of creditors,  the  outcome
of  which depends  on complex  factors,  including  changes  in foreign  aid
budgets  in creditor  countries,  political  developments,  and  so  on.  Such
uncertainty  may contribute  to generating  instability  in the  indebted
economy,  thereby  discouraging  domestic  investment  (see,  for  example,
Claessens,  Oks,  and  Van  Wijnbergen  (1993)).
3.  Debt reduction.  moral  hazard  and  conditionality
As pointed  out in Section  II above,  when the  long-run  creditor-debtor
relationship  is  considered,  either  a strategy  of explicit  debt  reduction  or
one  of ongoing  flow  rescheduling  and/or  de  facto  rollovers  through  new  loans
may create  moral  hazard  problems. Specifically,  having  found  creditors
willing  to accept  a change  in scheduled  debt service  today,  the  debtor  (and
other  debtors)  may form  the  belief  that  creditors  have eased  their  position,
and that  more debt  will  be either  forgiven  or rolled  over  in the  future  as
long as the  country's  repayment  prospects  remain  clouded. This  reasoning,
of course,  may lead  to a reduction  in efforts  to service  the  debt  in the
future.- 24
To limit  moral  hazard,  creditors  have found  it necessary  to  apply
conditionality  to the  refinancing/rescheduling  process. Thus,  resources
are  disbursed  period-by-period  while the  country  policy  stance  is  closely
monitored  by the  Fund  and  the  Bank,  a process  dubbed  by some  observers
(e.g.  Williamson  (1988))  as the "short-leash"  approach. If debt  relief  is
provided  through  explicit  debt reduction,  the  impact  of  moral  hazard  can  be
lessened  if creditors  offer  debt reduction  only  to countries  that  have
established  a track  record  of responsible  policies,  and  whose  current  debt
difficulties,  therefore,  are largely  outside  of the  control  of  policymakers.
This  is the  type  of approach  taken  by the  Paris  Club in  determining
eligibility  for  stock-of-debt  operations  under  Naples  Terms  (see
IMF (1995a).
A potential  advantage  of refinancing/rescheduling  (accompanied  by
conditionality)  relative  to explicit  up front  debt  reduction  may  be that,
by allowing  the  Fund  and  the  Bank to  constantly  monitor  policy  performance
in the indebted  country,  it leads  to  better  policies  and less  moral  hazard
problems. With  a strategy  of granting  debt  reduction  after  a good  track
record  is  established,  on the  other  hand,  multilateral  creditors  may  lose
their  ability  to influence  policy  after  the  initial  period.
If there  are  reasons  to  believe  that  economic  reforms  and  sound
macroeconomic  policies  become  "self-sustaining"  after  the  initial  obstacles
are  overcome,  then  losing  the "short-leash"  may  not  have much  of an impact.
On the  other  hand,  a strategy  of explicit  debt  reduction  would  reduce  the
costs  of constant  negotiations  and  policy  monitoring. In the  HIPCs,  where
the  strength  and  depth  of the  professional  cadre  is limited,  these  costs
are  likely  to  be substantial  (Killick  (1993)  and  Martin  (1991)). Also,  the- 25 -
continual  negotiations  and  performance  evaluation  implied  by the "short-
leash"  approach  may increase  uncertainty  about  the  extent  of future  resource
flows  between  the  indebted  country  and official  creditors,  as these  flows
become  a function  not only  of budgetary  and  political  developments  in
creditor  countries,  but of  whether the  authorities  in the  indebted  country
will be deemed  to  have  maintained  a sufficient  degree  of compliance  with
the  policy  programs.
Some  authors  have  also  criticized  the  "short-leash"  approach  (and
policy  conditionality  in  general)  because  it impedes  local  "ownership"
of reform  programs  (e.g.  Berg (1991)  and  Killick  (1994)):  because  the
conditions  and  substance  of reform  programs  may  be seen  as  being  imposed
from  outside,  policymakers  may have difficulties  implementing  the  programs
because  they  or other  agents  are  not convinced  that  the  actions  being
required  are in  the  country's  own long-term  interest.  D21  This  criticism
is closely  related  to tho  existence  of adverse  incentives  for  undertaking
policy  reform  in the  presence  of a large  debt  overhang: if  authorities
22/  Evidence  on  ownership  and its  consequences  is  to  be found  in  various
reviews  of  World  Bank  adjustment  loans,  conducted  by its  Operations
Evaluation  Department  (OED). OED (1992)  attempted  to  quantify  the
relationship  using  a  methodology  developed  by Johnson  and  Wasty (1993).
On the  basis  of a review  of Program  Audit  Reports  (PARs),  81 loans  to
38 countries  (17  of them  HIPCs)  were classified  according  to their  ownership
and their  program  outcome. Statistical  analysis  indeed  confirmed  a
significant  relationship  between  program  ownership  and  program  outcome.
Almost  half  of the  programs,  however,  were classified  as  having  low  or very
low  degrees  of ownership.- 26 -
in the indebted country  perceive external creditors to be the main
beneficiaries of the reforms, then "ownership" will be weak, and program
implementation will be difficult. L1/
It should be emphasized, however,  that to the extent that the HIPCs
will continue to receive official resources in the form of concessional
loans (for instance,  ESAF and IDA resources) or bilateral grants even after
their external debt is red4ced, then these countries would still  be subject
to conditionality and their policies would continue to  be scrutinized by
the Fund and the Bank.  The major benefit from abandoning the "short leash",
then, would be to put an end to the process of applying conditionality to
the rescheduling and roll-overs of old debt obligations.
Finally, for the "short-leash" approach to be effective it is crucial
that the creditors' or donors' threat of suspending new inflows  when policy
goes off track be credible (see, for example, the analysis in  Mosley,
Harrigau, and Toye (1995)).  Hence, the resolve of the official
donor/creditor community as a whole  to suspend disbursements when a
country fails to comply  with performance  criteria is a necessary element
for an effective strategy to address the HIPCs debt problems.  The World
Bank (1994) looked at the relationship between change in net external
transfers per capita and change in macroeconomic policies in the 1980s in
Sub-Saharan Africa.  This study found that countries that benefited from
increased transfers  between 1981-86 and 1987-91 were almost equally split
23/  Also related to this argument  is the hypothesis of the "catalytic"
effect of debt relief advanced by Cline  (1995).  According to this
hypothesis, the willingness of creditors  to offer explicit debt reduction
allows policymakers in the indebted country to claim that "we  have succeeded
in putting the debt problems behind us", thereby increasing domestic support
for economic reform and increasing future willingness to pay.- 27 -
between  those  whose  macroeconomic  policies  improved  and  those  whose
policies  deteriorated.  A recent  assessment  by the  Fund  on ESAF
arrangements  (IMF  (1995a))  concludes  that transfers  from  official
creditors/donors  have  generally  rewarded  HIPCs  making  stronger  policy
adjustment  efforts,  although  it also concluded  that,  while  progress  had
been made, the  achievement  of external  viability  was still  in  question  and
that growth  remained  somew4at  below  that judged  feasible  in a  number  of
countries.
It should  also  be noted  that,  if one  of the  shortcomings  of the  current
debt strategy  is thought  to  be the  difficulty  in applying  credible  policy
conditionality,  then  the  appropriate  solution  would  be to  create  the
conditions  for  a  more  effective  implementation  of Fund  and  Bank  programs
in the  HIPCs. Unless  strong  incentives  to pursue  appropriate  policies  are
created,  additional  debt  reduction  would not  bring  to an end  the  HIPCs  debt
problems,  but it  would  simply  be followed  by more rescheduling  and
roll-overs  in the  future.
V.  Debt  and  Economic  Performance: Evidence
The previous  section  showed  that  theoretical  analysis  yields  a  number
of hypotheses  on the  impact  of debt on economic  performance. Implied  by
these  hypotheses  are  alternative  approaches  to debt  relief--debt  reduction
upfront  or after  a track  record  is established,  ongoing  rescheduling  or
writedowns  with conditionality,  etc.  It  would  be important  to  assess  the
evidence  on the  various  hypotheses  as the  basis  for  forming  a  judgment  on
the  appropriate  policy  response  to the  debt  problem  of the  HIPCs  in  general
and those  of specific  individual  countries. This section  considers  two*  28 -
types  of evidence  available  in the  literature: that  on the  relationship
between  debt and investment,  and  evidence  on the  impact  of the  Brady  plan
in  middle-income  countries.
1.  Debt and investment
There is a large  literature  on the determinants  of growth  and
investment  in developing  cpuntries. Although  none  of the  studies  focusses
exclusively  on the  HIPCs,  a  number  of them  include  HIPCs in  the
sample.  24/  Most econometric  studies  include  a fairly  standard  set  of
domestic,  external,  policy  and  exogenous  explanatory  variables. Some  of
these  studies  have also  included  debt  variables. Not surprisingly,  almost
all such  studies  find  one  or more debt  variables  to be significantly  and
negatively  correlated  with investment  or growth  (depending  on  the  focus
of the  study). While  this  evidence  provides  prima  facie  support  for  the
argument  that  debt  and  economic  performance  are  negatively  related,  it
still  leaves  open the  two  key questions:  the  relative  importance  of  debt
vis-A-vis  other  factors;  and  the  channels  of the  adverse  impact  of debt.
While  most studies  include  key  exogenous  and  policy  variables,  such
as indicators  of (the  disequilibrium  of) the  exchange  rate,  the  degreo  of
openness  of the  economy,  fiscal  balance,  or the  domestic  real  interest  rate,
ZL/  A selection  of these  studies  includes:  Borensztein  (1990b),
EBS/95/162,  Cohen (1993,  1995),  Greene  and  Villanueva  (1991),  Hadjimichael
et  al..  (1995),  Jenkins  (1995),  Oshikoya  (1994),  Serven  and  Solimano  (1991),
Kumar  and  Mlambo (1995),  Warner  (1994),  Savvides  (1992),  Mlambo  and
Mhlophe  (1995). Cohen  (1993)  and Savvides  (1993)  use  a large  sample  of
LDCs  which includes  most of the  HIPCs,  and Cohen  (1995),  Oshikoya  (1994),
Kumar  and  Mlambo  (1995),  and  Hadjimichael  et al. (1995)  focus  on  Sub-Saharan
Africa,  where  most of the  HIPCs  are  located.- 29 -
the  question  arises  whether  these  sufficiently  control  for  country
circumstances  and,  if  not,  whether  the  debt  variables  pick  up the  effect  of
some  other,  omitted  exogenous  or policy  factors  or whether  there  are
feedback  effects  to  other  variables  that  mask the  effects  of the  high levels
of external  debt.  By nature  of econometric  estimation,  this  question  can
not  be resolved  definitively. In an analysis  of the  relationship  between
growth  and investment  and  4ebt  burdens  in HIPCs,  IMF (1996)  also  concludes
that it is difficult  to disentangle  the  role  of debt overhang  from  other
factors. Several  studies,  however,  have found  that  debt  variables  have
statistically  significant  negative  relationships  with subsecuent  investment
or performance,  even  after  controlling  for  other,  contemporaneous  factors.
This  provides  a relatively  robust  indicatiorn  of the  negative  effect  of debt
on economic  performance. Furthermore,  the  theoretical  analysis  indicates
that  the  debt  burden  can  negatively  affect  some  of the  control  variables
themselves. For example,  debt  can affect  the  domestic  real  interest  rate.
Because  investment  is also  affected  by the  real  interest  rate,  the  impact  of
debt  on investment  is likely  underestimated  when the  real  interest  rate  is
also included  in the  regression.
The second  difficulty  relates  to the two  channels  through  which  debt
variables  can  affect  growth  or investment:  one is a "pure"  debt  overhang
effect;  the  second  refers  to a "crowding  out"  effect. Most  studies  of
investment  equations  generally  do not  distinguish  between  the  crowding  out
and the  overhang  effect  and  the  mere statistical  significance  of debt
variables  is then  also  not sufficient  to isolate  the importance  of the  debt
overhang. To distinguish  between  the  two  effects,  both the  contemporaneous
debt service  and  a  variable  capturing  the  burden  of future  debt  service*  30 -
(such  as the  debt  stock  or the present  value  of future  debt  service)  should
be included  in  the  regression  analysis.
Greene  and  Villanueva  (1991),  Savvides  (1993),  and  Kumar  and
Mlambo (1996)  are  examples  of studies  of investments  in  developing
countries  which  include  both  variables  as separate  determinants.  Greene
and  Villanueva  find  evidence  of an overhang  effect,  but their  sample  of
developing  countries  does  pot include  any  HIPCs. On the  other  hand,  for
a large  sample  of developing  countries  including  some  of the  HIPCs,
Savvides  (1993)  finds  that,  while debt service  crowded  out  investment,  the
debt-to-GNP  ratio  had a  negative  but insignificant  coefficient,  indicating
that the  hypothesis  of  no debt overhang  effects  could  not  be rejected.
Kumar  and  Mlambo  reach  the  same conclusion  in  a study  of investment  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa. These  results,  however,  should  be viewed  with  caution,
because  the  studies  do not correct  their  overhang  variable  (the  ratio  of
the stock  of debt  to  GDP  or to exports)  for  the  degree  of concessionality
of the  loans. Hence,  the  measure  of indebtedness  used does  not accurately
reflect  differences  in the  burden  of future  debt  service  across  countries.
Also,  both Greene  and  Villanueva  (1991)  and  Kumar  and  Mlambo  (1996)  include
the  real interest  rate  as a regressor,  which  is  possibly  related  to the  debt
burden  through  both an overhang  and a crowding  out  effect. For  middle-
income  countries,  Warner  (1992)  and Cohen  (1993)  use a  more indirect  way to
attempt  to identify  the  effect  of the  1980s  debt  crisis  on investment.
They estimate  investment  equations  prior to  the  debt  crises  and  assess  their
predictive  power  during  the  period  of the  crises. Warner  (1992)  concludes- 31 -
that the  debt  crisis  did  not  depress investment,  while  Cohen  (1993)
concludes  that  it  was the  crowding  out effect  of current  debt  servicing
which  was significant.
One  other  approach  to identifying  the  pure debt  overhang  effect  is
to estimate  the  "debt  Laffer  curve"  through  secondary  market  debt  prices.
Claessens  (1990)  finds  that  out  of 29 middle-income  countries,  five  were on
the "wrong"  side  of the  Laffer  curve,  suggesting  that  partial  debt  reduction
would increase  the  expected  repayment  to the  creditors. Claessens
et  al.  (1991)  find,  depending  on the  exact  specification  of their  model,
that 6 to 15 out  of 35  countries  were on the "wrong"  side  of the  debt
Laffer  curve. In  both  papers,  only extremely  indebted  countries  were on
the "wrong"  side  of the  Laffer  curve.  Cohen  (1990)  does  not  find
econometric  support  for  the  proposition  that  reducing  the  nominal  value
of debt  would  increase  its  market  value.  However,  studies  using  secondary
market  prices  to  measure  debt  overhang  raise  issues  of interpretation:  an
explicit  reduction  in the  face  value of debt  may  have  little  effect  on the
secondary  market  prices,  not  because there  is  no debt  overhang,  but  because
market  participants  expect  some debt reduction  to occur,  and  that
expectation  is  built  into  the  price.  Finally,  for  the  case  of the  HIPCs
the relevance  of this  evidence  is only marginal  since  secondary  market
prices  are  only  available  for  commercial  debt  and  most of the  HIPCs  debt
is official.
2.  Imgact  of the  Brady  Dlan
The Brady  plan,  first  put forward  in 1989,  involved  a concerted  debt
relief  package  where  commercial  banks could  choose  from  a menu  of new  money- 32 -
and debt stock  reduction  options,  implemented  in  a framework  of policy
conditionality. In  practice,  few commercial  banks  were  willing  to lend  new
money  and the  Brady  plan  has  largely  been debt  reduction,  with  commercial
debt stocks  on average  reduced  by 45 percent (IMF,  1995). The  Brady  plan
countries  thus  provide  useful  case studies  of the  effects  of  debt  reduction
on economic  performance  and  capital  flows. However,  as the  Brady  plan  was
concerned  with  middle-incope  countries  mainly  indebted  to  commercial
creditors,  the  evidence  may  have limited  relevance  for  the  HIPCs. There
have been several  studies  of the  first  Brady deal--that  for  Mexico,  and  of
those for  other  countries.  Two general  conclusions  emerge. One,  the
central  role  of  macroeconomic  stabilization  and  economic  reforms  undertaken
prior to debt  reduction.  And second,  the  main channel  through  which  the
debt reduction  affects  growth  is through  a reduction  in  uncertainty;  the
reduction  in future  transfers  appears to  matter  less.
Berthelemy  and  Vourc'h  (1994)  evaluate  the  impact  of the  Mexico  Brady
deal.  They  use a  calibrated  simulation  model focusing  on three  key  prices:
the domestic  interest  rate,  the  price of debt on the  secondary  market  and
the real exchange  rate. They  conclude  that the  Brady  plan  speeded  up
recovery  and  dispelled  the  uncertainties  which  were  weighing  on the  success
of the  new economic  reform  program  at the  beginning  of 1989. They  also
conclude  that if  Mexico  had not  corrected  its  fiscal  and  macroeconomic
imbalances  prior  to the  deal,  the  debt relief  obtained  would  not  have  been
sufficient  to restore  a recovery  of growth  and  creditworthiness'.  Oks  and
van Wijnbergen  (1994)  and  Claessens,  Oks and  van  Wijnbergen  (1993)  come to
similar  conclusions  in  their  analysis  of the impact  of the  Brady  deal in
Mexico,  highlighting  the  role  of uncertainty. They conclude  that  the- 33 -
impact  of the  Brady  deal  came  not  primarily  through  a reduction  in  external
transfers  (either  current  or future)  but through  the  fact  that  the  deal
removed  uncertainty  associated  with continual  ongoing  reschedulings.
These  conclusions  are  further  confirmed  by IMF (1995b)  which
investigates  the  behavior  of private  investment  in  eight,  both  low-  and
middle-income  countries  (Bangladesh,  Chile,  Ghana,  India,  Mexico,  Morocco,
Senegal  and  Thailand). Al;hough  no independent  "debt  overhang"  effect  on
investment  was identified,  the  study  concludes  that  indirect  evidence
suggests  that  an earlier  resolution  of these  countries'  debt  burden  would
have yielded  a faster  rebound  in investment  through  both the  effect  of
a reduction  in  uncertainty  and  the lowering  of country-risk  premia  and
interest  rates.
IMF (1992-95),  World  Bank (1993),  Cline (1995),  and  Fernandez-
Arias (1993),  among  others,  review  the  consequences  of Brady  agreements
for  other  countries  (Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Venezuela,  among  others).
These  papers'  findings  are  that  secondary  market  prices  for  debt  rose
generally. Cline,  for  example,  noted that for  Argentina,  the  country  risk
spread  fell  sharply  after  the  deal in  April 1993.  Similarly,  there  was a
sharp turnaround  in  private  capital  flows  to most countries,  typically
around  the  time  when the  Brady  agreement  was agreed  upon. This  happened
in  Venezuela  in 1990,  but  by 1992  private  flows  to  Venezuela  fell  off  again
after  policy  slippages--showing  once again  the importance  of  a sound  policy
framework  for debt  reduction  to  have a positive  impact  on  private  capital
flows,  investment  and  growth.- 34 -
The experience  with the  Brady  plan suggests  that an important
beneficial  effect  of concerted  debt  reduction  may be to  bolster  confidence
in the  process  of policy  reform  undertaken  by the  authorities  in  the
indebted  country: from  this  perspective,  the  willingness  of  commercial
creditors  to grant  debt  reduction  is  viewed  by foreign  investors  as an
"endorsement"  by the international  financial  community  that  the  country
is successfully  pursuing  sound  macroeconomic  policies  and  structural  reform.
This endorsement  opens  the  way for  renewed  foreign  capital  inflows  that
stimulate  growth. These  considerations  suggest  that  offers  of increased
debt relief  for the  HIPCs  may  only  have positive  effects  on  economic
performance  observed  in the  case  of the  Brady  deals  if they  are  interpreted
by  international  investors  as an endorsement  of a strong  and  effective
program  of economic  stabilization  and  reform.
VI.  Concluding  Remarks
The analytical  arguments  reviewed  in this  paper  on the  links  between
debt and  economic  performance  have implications  for  whether  or not
consideration  should  be given  to more debt  reduction  for  HIPCs  over  and
above  that  provided  for  under  current  mechanisms. Ongoing  refinancing
with conditionality,  as opposed  to upfront  debt  reduction,  reduces  moral
hazard  and  provides  countries  with incentives  to maintain  good  policies.
But, at the  same  time,  this "short-leash"  approach  has transactions  costs,
can create  uncertainty,  and  can impede  local  ownership  of reform  programs.
Upfront  debt  reduction  may create  moral  hazard  problems,  and  may  weaken
the  incentives  for  maintaining  sound  policy. But there  are  theoretical
arguments  relating  to a  debt  overhang  as to why a  high level  of debt  can- 35 -
impede  investment  and  policy  reform,  since  the  potential  returns  from
these  may  be expected  to be "taxed  away"  to  repay  creditors.
A number  of econometric  studies,  based  mainly  on the  experience  of
middle-income  highly  indebted  countries,  find  that investment  is  negatively
correlated  with external  debt  variables. A few  have found  similar  effects
for  African  countries. While  suggestive,  these  results  need to  be treated
with caution: debt  variab,es  may  be picking  up the  influence  of other
factors  or  vice  versa,  and  most studies  do not  distinguish  between  debt
stock  and  debt  servicing  effects. From  a different  perspective,  some
researchers  have  found  that  Brady  Plan  debt  operations  for  certain  middle-
income  countries  have  had  beneficial  effects  on economic
performance--principally  by reducing  uncertainty--but  only  when  preceded  by
a  period  of strong  policy  reforms. In sum,  while  the  hypothesis  that  HIPCs
suffer  from significant  adverse  effects  from  overhangs  of debt  is
inconclusive  at  present,  evidence  from  the  middle-income  countries  does
suggest  that  high levels  of external  debt  may act  as a constraint  on
investment  and  growth,  and  that debt  reduction  can  have  beneficial  effects
if the  policy  environment  is right.  -
In conclusion,  the  general  analytical  arguments  reviewed  in this  paper
highlight  the  key  issues  that arise  in  any  assessment  of proposals  for
further  debt  reduction  beyond  what is  embodied  in existing  mechanisms.  And,
if further  debt  reduction  is to  be considered,  this  would require  detailed
quantitative  analysis  for  the  countries  in question,  to arrive  at a
judgement  as to the  balance  of the  different  forces  at play.- 36 -
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